In cellular systems, confidentiality of uplink transmission with respect to eavesdropping terminals can be ensured by creating intentional interference via scheduling of concurrent downlink transmissions. In this paper, this basic idea is explored from an information-theoretic standpoint by focusing on a two-cell scenario where the involved base stations (BSs) are connected via a finite-capacity backbone link. A number of transmission strategies are considered that aim at improving uplink confidentiality under constraints on the downlink rate that acts as an interfering signal. The strategies differ mainly in the way the backbone link is exploited by the cooperating downlink to the uplink-operated BSs. Achievable rates are derived for both the Gaussian (unfaded) and the fading cases, under different assumptions on the channel state information available at different nodes. Numerical results are also provided to corroborate the analysis. Extensions to scenarios with more than two cells are briefly discussed as well. Overall, the analysis reveals that a combination of scheduling and base-station cooperation is a promising means to improve transmission confidentiality in cellular systems. Index Terms-Cellular systems, perfect secrecy, physical-layer wireless security, wireless infrastructure networks, wireless interference, wire-tap channel. 1556-6013/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE Petar Popovski (M'97-A'98-M'04) received the Dipl.-Ing. degree in electrical engineering and the M.Sc. degree in communication engineering from
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONFIDENTIALITY is a crucial requirement in many wireless systems due to the increasing role of on-line transactions and the usage of personal data. In informationtheoretic terms, perfect secrecy (or confidentiality) implies the impossibility for a given eavesdropping terminal to harness any information about the transmitted message from its received signal [1] . This provides an even stronger guarantee than the traditional cryptography, where secrecy relies on the computational limitations of the eavesdropper (also referred to as the wiretapper).
A. Information-Theoretic Secrecy
The information-theoretic concept of secure communications over noisy channels was defined in [1] and [2] , where it is shown that it is feasible to communicate with perfect secrecy to a legitimate receiver unless the wiretapper benefits from a "less Manuscript received March 11, 2008;  revised December 22, 2008 . First published April 28, 2009 ; current version published May 15, 2009 . The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Klara Nahrstedt.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2009.2020776 noisy" channel from the source than the legitimate receiver. This result was confirmed by [3] which extended the results of [1] and [2] to Gaussian models, thus bringing this concept closer to the wireless networks. The results of [3] demonstrate that perfect secrecy requires the wiretapper to suffer from a worse signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the intended receiver. These initial works lead to the rather pessimistic conclusions that perfect secrecy via physical-layer (coding) techniques is demanding and hardly "practical." Two recent results have spurred a renewed interest in the field of information-theoretic secrecy. In [4] (and then [5] ), a more general model is treated, in which the two legitimate users and the wiretapper have access to correlated random variables and can communicate over a noiseless public channel. Maurer in [4] proves that in this model the two legitimate users can obtain a non-null shared key with perfect secrecy through a public-channel discussion, even when the wiretapper benefits from better channel conditions. The second class of results stems from the observation that in wireless networks, due to time-varying fading, the situation naturally arises where the SNR at the wiretapper is (at least temporarily) worse than at the legitimate user. This idea was exploited in [19] and [20] , for a single-antenna point-to-point link in the presence of an eavesdropper and quasi-static or ergodic fading, respectively. 1 Moreover, in wireless networks, interference can be judiciously generated so as to decrease the SNR (or more precisely the signal-to-noise-plus-interference ratio) in given areas of interest [21] . The fading and the superposition property of the wireless medium turn out to be potentially beneficial information-theoretic secrecy over the wireless channel. The ideas and works recalled above have led to a number of extensions including multiantenna [multiple input-multiple output (MIMO)] links and/or multiuser systems. A brief discussion of such previous works can be found in Appendix A. This current paper can be seen as an application of the same basic principles in the context of cellular communications. 2 
B. Secure Communications in Cellular Systems
In this paper, we focus on secure communications for cellular systems, as most of confidential transactions are expected to be conducted over such networks in the near future. A novel basic approach to ensuring confidentiality is proposed that exploits uplink/downlink scheduling of transmissions in adjacent cells and cooperation at the base station (BS) level. This follows the Fig. 1 . Illustration of a system with cooperating BSs B and C, an uplink terminal A, an eavesdropping mobile station E and a downlink user D. line of research opened by [16] , where it was shown that cooperative transmission, beside being able to improve throughput or reliability (see, e.g., [15] ), can also be instrumental in enhancing the confidentiality of transmission. BS cooperation is currently being widely investigated as a key enabler for high-data rate infrastructure networks [18] , [17] , and is made possible by the presence of high-capacity backbone links connecting the BSs. The main contribution of this work is to show that such technology can also bring significant gains in terms of secure communications.
The proposed techniques aim at securing uplink transmissions from terminals to a given BS. The basic idea is to schedule downlink BS transmissions at the same time as the concurrent uplink transmissions of interest, so as to create intentional interference on the possible eavesdroppers. Cooperation at the BS level is then used to convey information about the downlink transmission to the uplink-operated BS (uplink) over a finite-capacity backbone. This enables the uplink-operated BS to partially mitigate interference from the BS transmission. The approach is similar to [21] , [22] , [16] , and [23] , where artificial noise jams the reception of the eavesdropper, while using techniques to avoid interference at the intended receiver. In [21] , this interference mitigation is obtained by exploiting the structure and reciprocity of multiantenna fading channels, while [22] and [23] leverage an infinite-capacity backbone between receiving and jamming antennas. We propose several new schemes based on the above mentioned basic idea, each of them using a combined wireless/backbone transmission. The schemes and the corresponding achievable rates are investigated and compared via analysis and simulations.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
We first introduce the scenario of interest and the relevant quantities, and then investigate the reference case where the BSs do not cooperate through an infrastructure.
A. Scenario
We focus on two adjacent cells served by single-antenna BSs as in Fig. 1 , where the two BSs are connected by a high-capacity, typically wired, backbone link. The BSs are termed and , respectively. Terminal within the first cell has a message to deliver to under constraints of confidentiality with respect to the activity of , the eavesdropping terminal. is assumed to be within the transmission range of terminal , as otherwise it would not pose any threat to the confidentiality of 's message, but also of the adjacent BS . The main idea behind the considered transmission strategy is that the uplink transmission from to can be scheduled at the same time as the downlink transmission from towards a given terminal in its range.
Hence, effectively acts as a jammer on the reception at , but this jamming is accomplished without exploiting any additional system resource since it is obtained from a regular downlink transmission. Note this approach is not intended to secure the communication -. A few remarks on the virtues and limitations of the considered model are in order. First, we remark that, in the scenario at hand, the downlink transmission from to can be secured indirectly by letting terminal communicate securely in uplink a one-time pad to that can use in the next downlink transmission. Therefore, our focus on the uplink transmission is not restrictive in this sense and may enable overall security in the system to be achieved. Moreover, the focus on a two-cell system is justified if one assumes that: 1) the wiretapper is not aware of the codebooks (i.e., modulation, coding) used in other surrounding cells: in this case, transmissions from other cells would have to be considered as Gaussian noise (see, e.g., [27] ) and thus would be accounted for by our model; 2) no coordination via backhaul links is possible from to other BSs. In the more complex case where such assumptions are violated, the analysis presented here provides the necessary tools for extensions, as we briefly discuss in Section VIII.
1) System Model: The terminal randomly selects a ratemessage from the set and encodes it via a sequence of complex channel inputs with normalized average power constraint . Encoding takes place through a (possibly stochastic) mapping: [1] , [3] . Vectors of symbols are represented throughout the paper by bold letters. At the same time, BS transmits a rate-downlink message , randomly selected from the set , with an average power of . The actual codebook used by is assumed to be subject to design and thus depends on the specific cooperative strategy employed by BSs and . This will be specified for different proposed techniques in the following sections. The capacity of the backbone link is , measured in bit/symbol. We consider bandwidth that is normalized to 1 Hz, such that bit/symbol is equivalent to bit/second (b/s). We assume full synchronization between the transmissions of and at the receiver of . Finally, to account for a worst-case scenario, synchronization is also assumed at the receiver of eavesdropping terminal , and the latter is endowed with information about the codebooks used by and .
The complex channel coefficient between any two nodes and is denoted by , while the th symbol transmitted by node is denoted by ( and ). The signal received by and , respectively, at the th symbol reads
Each noise component is a complex Gaussian white noise with unit power, so that if the node transmits with power , the corresponding received SNR at the node is
In most of the paper (Sections III-VI), we focus on Gaussian (unfaded) channels, where the channel gains (3) are fixed and deterministic. In practice, these rates can be achieved, for given channel realizations, when channel state information is known at the receiver side, and all the channel gains of interest are known to terminal , while the channel gains and are known to the downlink-operated BS . Also, knows its channels towards the corresponding transmitters. In Section VII, the analysis will be extended to a fading scenario under different assumptions on the channel state information at the transmitters' side.
Finally, the BS decodes through a mapping . According to standard definitions [1] , [3] , a rate is said to be achievable with perfect secrecy with respect to eavesdropper if, as the number of samples per coding block a) the decoding error at BS vanishes (4) and b) the uncertainty (equivocation) of eavesdropper regarding 's message, measured as the conditional entropy of given the signal received by normalized over the unconditional entropy, satisfies .
B. Some Useful Functions
To simplify the presentation of the results in this paper, it is useful to define the following two functions. The first function is the standard capacity of a Gaussian single link with source and receiver , and SNR equal to (5) The second function pertains to the performance of a multiple-access channel (MAC) with two users and and receiver . It measures the supremum of the achievable rates from to for a given transmission rate of . Notice that rate is not restricted to be within the MAC capacity region, that is, it is not necessarily decodable by . Given the SNRs and , the function is given by (6) , shown at the bottom of the page.
C. Perfect Secrecy Without Backbone Link
Here, we briefly discuss the baseline scenario where no backbone link exists between BSs and . In such a case, no cooperation via the backbone link is possible, and we assume that the BS transmits with a standard Gaussian codebook , where variables are generated as complex Gaussian independent with zero mean and power . As explained above, this codebook conveys information to a downlink user . Given this setup, it can be readily seen that the considered approach coincides with the strategy considered in [16] under the name noise-forwarding (NF). It was shown therein that the secrecy capacity can be found by considering the compound MAC, with two receivers and and two transmitters and . In particular, for the Gaussian case of interest here, and using the function (6), the result of [16] (Theorem 3) can be restated as follows.
Proposition 1: If sends in downlink at rate and there is no backbone link , the rate is achievable with perfect secrecy with respect to eavesdropper 3 (7) with and defined in (6) . From (7) , it can be seen that an increase in the secrecy rate can be obtained by either increasing the achievable rate to the intended destination or hampering reception of the eavesdropper [decreasing ].
III. UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRECY RATE
To evaluate the upper bound, we consider an enhanced system in which the BS is informed by a genie about the signal transmitted by BS . Since the codebook of is known at , this corresponds to assuming that the backhaul capacity is so that message can be sent over the backhaul. As a result, BS can effectively cancel the interference signal from the received signal (1) and the rate achievable in this enhanced system upper bounds that of the original model. With such a complete interference cancelation at , the equivalent received signal is (8) This implies that for any we have (9) from which the following proposition easily follows. Proposition 2: If BS transmits in downlink with rate , the rate achievable with perfect secrecy is upper bounded by (10) with defined in (6) . This upper bound is achievable if . Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 3 of [16] (see discussion in Section II-C).
The upper bound (10) is plotted in Fig. 2 along with the capacity of the direct link and the maximum achievable rate at the eavesdropper for . A relevant quantity that can be observed from 3 We define Here R = C( )0R is the amount of information spent by A to "confound" the eavesdropper E in order to achieve a rate R with perfect secrecy. the figure is the rate . This can be interpreted as the rate loss that terminal must sacrifice to the aim of "confounding" the eavesdropper and thus achieving rate with perfect secrecy. For this particular example, when , the single-user link -is less noisy than the link -and, therefore, the secrecy capacity is zero. As the downlink rate increases, while the achievable rate on the link -is clearly unaffected [see (8) ], the rate decodable by the eavesdropper decreases (for large enough), and thus a positive secrecy rate is obtained as soon as . In particular, the secrecy rate increases linearly with until it reaches the maximum value for . It can be easily seen that this value of corresponds to the case where the signal from acts as a Gaussian noise with power , which is known to be the worst-case jammer on (see, e.g., [26] ).
Two final remarks on the case are in order: a) With a large-capacity backbone, the secrecy rate is a nondecreasing function of the downlink rate . b) With a large-capacity backbone, the value of the inter-BS channel gain is irrelevant to the system performance. This clearly contrasts with the case of from Section II-C: for instance, for the chosen SNRs in the example in Fig. 2 , if in addition we assume , it can be seen from (7) that with the secrecy rate is identically zero. When , the information received by via the backhaul is not enough to completely eliminate the interference from the BS to the BS . In this case, should be able to use the backhaul capacity to at least partially cancel the interference from the BS . In the following two sections, we describe different strategies that can be used by the BS in order to provide the adjacent BS with some information about the downlink transmitted waveform that enables interference mitigation at and thus improvement of the secrecy rate
[recall the discussion about (7)].
IV. QUANTIZATION-BASED TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES
In this section, we describe two strategies based on source coding arguments (quantization) for transferring information from to , while the next section proposes strategies based on channel coding principles. For the strategies considered in this section, we assume, as above, that the BS employs a standard randomly generated Gaussian codebook.
A. Elementary Quantization
The first considered approach is based on quantizing the downlink codeword via a rate-Gaussian codebook. Quantization/compression is done by using standard joint typicality-based vector quantization [25] and does not exploit here any side information available at the receiver [elementary quantization (EQ)]. Given its optimality in a rate-distortion sense, here we consider a Gaussian test channel, which we represent for convenience in the forward form [24] 
where is i.i.d. complex Gaussian quantization noise with power . From basic rate-distortion theory, it follows that the following condition should be satisfied: (12) which, as mentioned above, reflects the fact that the quantization process at is oblivious to the fact that there is a parallel wireless link between and that conveys side information. Since , the quantization error power can be found from (12) as , such that the SNR on the equivalent channel (11) reads (13) The quantization codebook is assumed to be known to the BS , which uses the received index from the backbone link to decompress the signal into . Proposition 3: If BS transmits in downlink with rate , the EQ-based strategy achieves with perfect secrecy the rate given by (14) with defined in (6) and (15) , shown at the bottom of the next page, and . The proof of the this proposition is given in Appendix B. It can be seen that, unlike the large-backbone case of Proposition 2, here the achievable rate (14) is not a monotonically increasing function of since the latter affects (decreases) also . Moreover, it can be shown that only for , the rate (14) tends to the large-backbone secrecy rate (10) due to the residual quantization noise for any finite . In practice (also used in Sections VI and VII), whenever the instantaneous rate , the message is not quantized and is completely transferred over the backhaul.
B. Wyner-Ziv Quantization
The approach presented above can be improved by designing the quantization scheme according to Wyner-Ziv compression with side information at the decoder [28] [Wyner-Ziv quantization (WZ)]. In fact, the wireless signal received by BS is correlated with the signal transmitted by BS and can thus be used as side information at the decoder. From [28] , the following relationship should now hold: (16) By using the Gaussian forward test channel (11) , the power of the quantization noise and the respective equivalent quantization SNR can be easily derived (see Appendix C) leading to the equivalent SNR (17) Achievable rates with Wyner-Ziv compression then follow directly from Proposition 3 by simply replacing in (13) with (17) . If , this scheme has clearly no advantage over the EQ considered above due to the absence of useful side information at the receiver.
V. SUPERPOSITION CODING-BASED TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES
Here we investigate a channel coding-based strategy to exploit the backbone link with capacity satisfying the condition . The strategy is based on rate-splitting encoding at BS so that, differently from the previous sections, changes the format of its wireless transmission to facilitate the information transfer over the backbone. This assumption requires downlink terminal to modify its decoding strategy accordingly (see details below). The message is transmitted by sending two independent messages with rates , respectively, such that (18) where is determined by the capacity of the downlink transmission by (19) The two messages are combined by using superposition coding, such that the th symbol sent by is (20) where is the power-division coefficient and . Notice that, unlike the previously described quantization-based scheme, here the downlink channel gain plays an important role, since any modification in the design of the transmission scheme at BS (i.e., rates and coefficient ) has to guarantee successful decoding at terminal . To elaborate, we assume that decoding at is carried out via successive interference cancellation, such that is first decoded and subtracted and then is decoded. Such a decoding imposes the following conditions on rates and coefficient :
For any , condition (19) is satisfied and we have freedom to chose . The basic idea of this strategy is to send one of the messages, either or (i.e., either the one decoded first or last by downlink user ), over the backbone. This implies either or , respectively. It is noted that once either of the latter condition is specified, this choice, by way of (21) and (22), uniquely determines the value of and, from (18), the remaining rate. As we will see in the next sections, the choice of which message to send over the backbone drastically impact the achievable secrecy rate, and neither strategy dominates the other.
A. Sending the Message Decoded Last by D
In this first case, we set , which, from (22), determines the following value of : (23) and the rate . BS can then use to cancel from its wireless received signal and the resulting received wireless signal at at the instance is (24) The following lemma follows (see proof in Appendix D).
Lemma 1: If BS transmits in downlink with rate using the superposition coding scheme with (23), the maximum rate achievable on the link -is given by otherwise (25) if if if (15) 
B. Sending the Message Decoded First by D
When is sent over the backbone, we set , resulting in (26) and
. After cancelling out , the MAC at is given as (27) The following result follows from the same arguments as in Appendix D.
Lemma 2: If BS transmits in downlink with rate using the superposition coding scheme with (26) , the maximum rate achievable on the link -is given by (28) , shown at the bottom of the page.
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate With Superposition Coding
Accounting for both options of sending either or over the backbone, we can now state the following result.
Proposition 4: If BS transmits in downlink with rate , the superposition-based strategy achieves the following rate with perfect secrecy:
with (30) where are defined in (25) and (28), and is given by (6) .
The proposition follows from Lemmas 2 and 1 and similar arguments as in the Proof of Proposition 1 [16] . In particular, one should calculate the maximum rate decodable by the eavesdropper for given and for the rate splitting strategy. It can be shown that this maximum rate is indeed as in (29), i.e., it is the same rate that we would have if BS had used a single-rate Gaussian codebook. This is because from (18), (21) , and (22) , it can be proved that any of the superposed messages is decodable if and only if the other is.
It can be shown by comparing (29) and (15) [with (13) ] that for downlink rate the performance of the superposition scheme coincides with the quantization scheme coincide since .
D. Some Comments on the Superposition Strategy
The achievable secrecy rate (29) contains maximization over the choice of which message should be sent over the backhaul link. This choice is made so as to optimize the maximum achievable rate on the link - (30) . In this regard, some general conclusion can be drawn by noticing that from the assumption it can be verified that such that sending over the backbone offers higher achievable rates . We give an intuitive explanation of the previous result. If a signal contains two superposed messages and one of those messages is known a priori, then this is equivalent to canceling power from the composite message. For example, if in (20) the message is known, then we cancel , which corresponds to the power of . Now we can ask: If we fix the condition and we set one of the rates ( or ) to be equal to , then in which case we can cancel the maximal amount of power from the composite message? From the previous discussions, if , then we determine . If is sent over the backhaul, then and the amount of power cancelled is . If , the amount of power cancelled is . Hence, using the condition (31), we conclude that sending over the backhaul implies minimal possible cancellation of power from the composite message (and thus at the receiver ) and the remaining power of the wireless signal from at is the largest possible. otherwise (28) 
At low
, this effect increases the interval of values for that are completely decodable at . Therefore, sending over the backhaul gives the higher achievable rate . However, when is large and thus not completely decodable at , then acts as a noise and such a high remaining power harms the rate achievable for large . But, when is sent over the backbone, the uncanceled part of the composite message has a minimum possible power, which is desirable when that portion of the signal sent by is undecodable and has to be treated as noise.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide some numerical examples for the performance of the proposed confidential transmission schemes when all the wireless channels are deterministic (unfaded), as assumed in the previous sections. We will use the following acronyms: EQ for elementary quantization, WZ for Wyner-Ziv quantization, and SUP for transmission based on superposition coding. In the cases , the message from is completely transferred via the backhaul, such that all the schemes behave identically.
We start by considering the maximum achievable rates with no confidentiality constrains from terminal to BS , namely (15), (13); (15), (17); (28); and (25) . These figures are relevant as the improvement in the maximal achievable rate from to is a direct indicator of the effectiveness of a particular strategy. Fig. 3 depicts such rates versus the downlink rate . For the chosen parameters (
[dB] and [b/s]), WZ is to be preferred for any value of the downlink rate . Moreover, by appropriately selecting which message is sent over the backbone ( or ), that is choosing between and , the SUP strategy outperforms the EQ for any . On this note, confirming the discussion of Section 3, we have that for lower it is more convenient to send over the backbone and vice versa for larger . Finally, we remark that, as pointed out in Section V-C, if the rate is large enough, the EQ strategy obtains a constant secrecy rate , which coincides with the asymptotic achievable for of the SUP strategy. Fig. 4 shows the achievable rate without confidentiality constraints (as Fig. 3 ) versus the SNR between the BSs . For low values of , the SUP strategy outperforms the WZ strategy. The U-shape of all the curves versus can be explained similarly to the arguments used to study interference channels with with weak and strong interference. Consider for instance the case . For low , BS cannot decode , but the wireless interference from at is weak, which makes the achievable rate -high. As increases, but still not sufficiently as to make rate decodable at , the achievable rate on link -drops. However, for strong interference , BS can decode and then subtract it, thus causing a low (if any) penalty to the rate from to . Fig. 5 depicts the derived secrecy rates for different values of versus the downlink rate for [dB] . Note that with such a choice of SNRs, the NF strategy [16] offers a zero secrecy rate, which implies that the presence of the backbone offers markedly improved secrecy. For small downlink rates , all proposed strategies have the same achievable secrecy rate as in the case of large backbone capacity studied in Section III up to a certain value of , which is the largest for the WZ strategy. Finally, as pointed out above, WZ offers substantial gains with respect to EQ, and, given the large in this example, also with respect to SUP (where SUP and EQ have the same performance for large ). Finally, Fig. 6 succinctly illustrates the relation between the maximal achievable rates and the achievable secrecy rates for the schemes with superposition and WZ. The link parameters had been chosen in a way that shows that no scheme is superior for all the values of .
VII. EXTENSION TO FADING CHANNELS In this section, we turn our attention to fading channels and reconsider the performance of the proposed transmission strategies under different assumptions regarding the channel state information available at different nodes.
A. Scenario and Performance Measures
The inter-BS link -is considered to be a line-of-sight and thus does not experience fading, i.e., is constant, while the other links are faded. We assume that a fading link features Rayleigh fading, such that the SNR of the link is independently and exponentially distributed with average value . Furthermore, we consider block fading, such that a fading channel stays constant for a sufficient number of symbols , where for coding purposes can be assumed to be infinity. It is noted that the assumption regarding the inter-BS link is reasonable if, e.g., the BSs are sufficiently elevated with respect to the rest of the network. As far as channel state information is concerned, terminal is assumed to know the channel gains (and the constant ), beside the downlink rate , so that it can calculate (and transmit at) the maximum instantaneous achievable rate in (6) . Other assumptions will be differently specified below for two scenarios, one in which we measure the outage probability and the other in which we assess the scheduling performance.
1) No Channel State Information: Outage Probability:
This scenario relies on the realistic assumption that the instantaneous fading channel to the eavesdropper and are not known to terminal and BS . In such a case, no nonzero rate is achievable with perfect secrecy, and therefore, one has to resort to the concept of outage probability [19] , [23] . In particular, given a target secrecy rate , the outage probability is defined as the probability that such is not achievable for the given transmission technique. It is noted that, for each fading realization, the value of is selected here as (19) , which requires BS to know the instantaneous downlink channel .
2) Full Channel State Information: Scheduling Performance:
In this second scenario, we assume full channel state information about all the fading channels at both terminal and BS . Given the full channel state information, it is relevant here to generalize the model to include uplink users that have data to transmit to and downlink users potentially receiving from BS . The goal is to analyze the impact of different scheduling and transmission strategies on the performance of the network at hand over fading channels. As throughout the paper, of particular interest is the impact of design choices on the trade-off between the downlink and the uplink secrecy rate . Regarding uplink scheduling, we assume that the uplink user is selected so as to maximize the uplink rate (36)
More interesting is the scheduling of the downlink transmissions from , for which we define two different types of schedulers: 1) scheduler: In this case the scheduled user is selected so as to maximize the downlink rate (37) 2) MaxSec scheduler: In this case, the selection of the user is done so as to maximize the uplink secrecy rate . Accordingly, the selection of depends on which method is used by to communicate over the backbone. If WZ quantization is used, the scheduler is denoted and we have
while if superposition is used, the scheduler is denoted and (39)
Note that, in general . Our results for the fading channels confirm that WZ is always outperforming EQ in terms of achievable secrecy rate and we have not plotted EQ in order to contribute to the clarity of the figures. Performance evaluation is then carried out by calculating the average secrecy rate and the average downlink rate , where the average is taken with respect to the fading channels given the scheduler .
B. Numerical Results
We present numerical results for the two scenarios. 1) Outage Probability: Fig. 7 depicts the outage probability as a function of the backbone capacity for [dB],
[dB], [b/s]. We recall that the value is selected according to the instantaneous SNR as (19) . The line is obtained by assuming that is large enough to accommodate any rate (strictly speaking, ). It can be seen that, as increases, the outage probability of all the strategies approaches this asymptotic performance, as it becomes highly probable that the given can accommodate the rate . The lower bound on the outage probability is obtained by assuming that sends pure Gaussian noise (which is the worst jamming signal, see, e.g., [26] ), that is perfectly transferred through the backbone . Another reference performance is set by the case , where no downlink transmission takes place. For low values of , the proposed schemes can actually be outperformed by such a solution. This is because, for low , the downlink transmission impairs not only reception at the eavesdropper , but also at the BS . The U-shape of the curves for the proposed strategies can be explained by resorting to similar arguments as for Fig. 4 (see Section VI). Following this remark, we note from Fig. 8 that the gain in terms of outage probability of all strategies with respect to the case is most relevant in the regime of weak/strong interference from BS (i.e., low/high ). In fact, it is in this regime that the interference from BS to (due to the realizations where has the least impact on the performance of the link -.
2) Scheduling Performance: Turning to the average rates that can be achieved in the scenario of full channel state information, Fig. 9 considered the downlink rates in terms of the ratios and for [dB]. These ratio demonstrate which fraction of the maximal average downlink throughput is achieved if the scheduler at aims to maximize the secrecy of the transmission -. Equivalently, the complement to one such ratio measures the fractional rate loss due to the requirement of maximizing the secrecy of the transmission -. The results show that at high , maximum secrecy is coherent with maximal rate . However, from Fig. 9 , it is seen that for lower maximal secrecy is not always achieved by maximizing , which is in accordance with the observations from Fig. 5 . Regarding the SUP strategy, there is one degenerative effect, which can be explained by observing the SUP curve on Fig. 5 . It can be seen (on the figure not discernible for ) that for large , the secrecy rate of the SUP scheme slowly decreases towards the asymptotic value (achieved for ), while for the quantization schemes there are finite values of after which the secrecy rate becomes constant. Hence, the scheduler that maximizes the secrecy tends to select lower rates when SUP is applied. Nevertheless, when , both SUP and WZ operate in identical way.
The average secrecy rates from to are then shown in Figs. 10 and 11 in terms of the ratios and . Thus, the figures show, for each transmission method (WZ or SUP), how much the secrecy rate is improved if the scheduler at determines the downlink user (and the corresponding rate ) in order to maximize the instantaneous rate rather than the downlink rate . It can be seen that for a weak link -(low ), as in Fig. 10 (where [dB]), the gain in the secrecy rate for the MaxSec schedulers is insignificant, which means that application of opportunistic scheduler at will be also good for the security of the link -. Conversely, for a strong link -, the results on Fig. 11 show that the secrecy of the link -can be boosted by selecting appropriate nonmaximal and in this case the opportunistic downlink scheduler at is not compatible with the secrecy requirements.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we further discuss the limitations of the considered model as well as possible ways to extend the analysis to scenarios with less restrictive assumptions.
It can be observed that the proposed schemes are effective in securing the area that is covered by the transmission of BS , e.g., to obtain statistically improved confidentiality with respect to all eavesdroppers that are within the transmission radius of BS . If one was instead interested in securing communications with respect to a specific eavesdropper , the model at hand would be hardly applicable, as the eavesdropper is a passive agent that is generally hard to locate. If is not interfered by , our analysis applies having set : In this case, the presented schemes will experience worse statistics for the achieved secrecy rate. As an example, if and , the model boils down to the fading wiretap channel [19] , [20] , in which the achievable secrecy rate depends purely on the relative quality of the fading conditions on the main link -and wiretap link -. Now we turn to the scenarios with more than two cells. Consider at first a situation where, beside the cell of interest with BS and terminal , we are interested in modeling the interference coming from adjacent cells, with BSs , assumed to be operated for simplicity in downlink with rates . Define as the backhaul capacity from BS to . Notice that we could account for some of the other cells being operated in uplink by appropriately redefining the channel gains and taking for that specific cell (no backhaul link exists between users and BSs). As explained in Section II-A, the more complex and interesting case arises when the eavesdropper is aware of the codebooks used by the BSs . Under this assumption, we discuss here the extension of Proposition 2 that sets an upper bound to the achievable secrecy rate and corresponds to setting for all . Following the Proof of Proposition 2, it is not difficult to see that the following upper bound holds [recall (10)]:
where generalizes the function in (6) and is defined as the capacity from to in the presence of interferers with known (Gaussian) codebooks of rates . Notice that the result of Proposition 1 corresponding to could also be easily extended along the same lines. Evaluation of the function is far from being straightforward, especially for large , but a computationally efficient procedure is described in [29] , to which we refer for further details.
The upper bound (40) is achievable, as explained above and similarly to Proposition 2, if for all . If any of these conditions is not satisfied, then one could exploit the backhaul capacity in order to mitigate the interference from to via quantization-based or superposition coding-based strategies, as done above for the two-cell case. A more practical approach that does not require demanding system-wide synchronization assumptions is for the BS to select a single "partner" BS to secure only the area covered by . In this case, the eavesdropper and treat the asynchronous interference coming from other cells as background Gaussian noise. How to select such a partner BS is a natural research question for the future work.
Consider now the case where multiple terminals, say , are interested in accessing BS with information-theoretic secrecy guarantees. Should the BS be inactive , the scenario would revert to the model extensively studied in [6] . With the transmission from BS , extension of our results would require the combination of the approaches of [29] and [6] . This appears to be feasible but not straightforward and is left for future research. Further on, if we consider a multicell system in which we want to secure several simultaneous uplink transmissions, each one to a different BS , then the extension of the proposed schemes requires a substantial investigation. For example, consider the case where the backhaul links are with unequal capacity. If the BS has a backhaul of towards and a backhaul of towards another uplink receiver , then it is not straightforward to extend the proposed schemes (e.g., the one with superposition coding) to enable efficient partial interference cancellation at both BSs, and . Finally, we remark that the presence of a backhaul link between the BSs could be exploited not only for enhancing secrecy, as elaborated upon in this paper, but also to increase the system throughput via multicell processing [18] . Investigation of the trade-offs between the two strategies and goals, namely secrecy via simultaneous uplink/downlink transmissions and throughput via multicell processing, is deemed to be outside the scope of this paper.
IX. CONCLUSION
Optimized scheduling and multicell BS cooperation are becoming increasingly standard features of current and future wireless infrastructure (cellular) networks. This work has advanced the notion that such technologies can play an important role in ensuring confidentiality (security) of wireless transmissions. From the analysis of several transmission strategies under different assumptions regarding propagation channels and corresponding channel state information, a number of conclusions have been drawn. In particular, a technique based on Wyner-Ziv compression over the backbone link connecting the BSs has proved to be the most promising, with the added benefit of requiring no modifications on the uplink/downlink transmissions of a conventional cellular systems. When complexity of Wyner-Ziv encoding is an issue, one could resort to simpler quantization schemes with a performance loss that depends on the network topology. Or else, if willing to modify the downlink transmission/reception strategy for the sake of ensuring uplink confidentiality, one could opt for channel coding (rather than source coding) based techniques which perform close (or even better than) Wyner-Ziv under some circumstances.
There are several interesting extensions of this work. A first issue, briefly discussed in Section VIII, is the extension to multiple cooperating BSs, which raises the question of how to organize the transmission/receive schedule for the BSs in order to maximize the secrecy effect, while not degrading the throughput. A second aspect would be to derive tighter upper bound than the one considered here by, e.g., leveraging more sophisticated genie-aided strategies. Finally, the study can be extended to consider colluding eavesdroppers, which attempt to jointly decode the desired signal and the interference from the downlink transmissions. 
APPENDIX A A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Here we cite a few of the most relevant works concerning multiantenna and/or multiuser wireless systems with secrecy constraints. The secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel was studied in [12] - [14] . Turning to multiuser channels, a scenario with two users communicating over a Gaussian MAC to a common receiver, or among them over a Gaussian two-way channel, with an external wiretapper was studied in [6] . A different multiple access scenario in which each user is interested in keeping its message secret to the other user is investigated in [7] . A fading broadcast model is studied in [8] where the transmitter communicates with two receivers while keeping one ignorant regarding the message intended for the other. An extension of this latter work is considered in [9] , where the transmitter is endowed with multiple antennas. Interference channels in which two users communicate to two distinct destinations while keeping the message secret from the other receiver are studied in [10] (see also [30] ). Finally, an extension of such work is considered in [11] , in which one of the two transmitter has "cognitive" capabilities (i.e., it knows a priori the message of the other user).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The equivalent signal seen at BS over both the wireless and wired channels in a given time instant can be written as a vector MAC channel (41) Let denote the maximum achievable rates from to for a given transmission rate when the quantization strategy is used [recall (6) ]. In order to determine , we have to examine the achievable region for the vector MAC channel with output (41) (42a) (42b) (42c)
where we have dropped the index for simplicity and represents normally distributed complex signal transmitted by . The first mutual information term can be determined as 
where (a) follows again from being conditionally independent of for given . The rate in (3) then easily follows.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF (49)
Using the model for the vector MAC channel as in (41), we get (49) and thus (49) easily follows.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Similar to Appendix A, we need to determine the maximal achievable rate . After is canceled at , the resulting MA channel at is (50)
We can first determine the capacity region of this MA channel (51) (52) (53)
Recall that the goal is to find the maximal achievable rate for given . However, we assume that and in this case it is fixed , such that varies due to . Hence, our problem transforms into finding the maximal achievable rate for given by considering the MA channel (50). Depending on the value of , we have two cases to consider: when is decodable at and when is not . But this situation is identical to the one described in Section II-B, such that we can easily arrive to (25) .
